The Fractured Himalaya: India China Tibet 1949-62 by Nirupama Rao

Author:Nirupama Rao
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9789354922886
Publisher: Penguin Group
Published: 2021-10-09T00:00:00+00:00

12

The Unravelling

‘What aim did Chinese comrades pursue in attacking Nehru so uncompromisingly? According to Comrade Mao Zedong, they unmask Nehru as a ‘double-dealer’, ‘half a man, half a devil’, ‘half a gentleman, half a hooligan’.1

—Mikhail Suslov, Soviet Communist Party ideologue reporting on a visit to China, 1959

If 1958 displayed signs of an unforeseen turbulence in India’s relations with China, the events to come in 1959 portended far worse. To the troubles brewing in the context of an unresolved boundary question, were to be added the aftermath of a widespread revolt against Chinese presence in Tibet, and the resultant flight of the Dalai Lama to India. Together with this came the first incidents of bloodshed involving the loss of life of Indian personnel in the border areas. All these events contributed to deepening anti-China public sentiment within India. The halcyon days of the ‘friendship of one billion’ were clearly over. The internal situation within China was also far from normal. Mao’s Great Leap Forward had proved disastrous for the country with widespread famine, rural distress and deprivation, drastic economic decline and millions of deaths from hunger and starvation. The Indian Embassy in Beijing reporting on the situation surmised that ‘China may resort to diversionary tactics and assume an international violent posture to wade over internal difficulties’.2

Internal political struggles within the leadership of the Communist Party also resulted in Mao Zedong adopting far more radicalized policies both on the domestic and foreign policy fronts. Tensions with the Soviet Union were growing over the latter’s espousing a policy of greater dialogue with the United States. Nor did Soviet warmth towards a non-aligned India please the Chinese. Nehru’s successful visit to Washington for talks with President Eisenhower in the winter of 1956 was another cause for concern in Beijing. The US and its western allies were now more willing than before to assist India’s economic development plans despite prior differences over its non-aligned status. They were also aware of the growing differences with China over the border issue. The failure of China’s economic programme and the disastrous Great Leap had lowered Chinese prestige. In the words of Allen Dulles, the CIA Director, the ‘image of Mao as the ‘all-wise father’ has been somewhat impaired.’3 In such a situation, it has been argued that it suited China to bring the differences with India over the border and over the Aksai Chin into the open, in order to ‘underline the power of China and show its importance’ and to show India as a ‘soft target.’4

Meanwhile in Tibet, tensions were mounting. The Chinese communists led by Mao, for their part, saw Tibet as a profoundly backward place, ridden with feudal societal values, and needing the reform-minded policies of the Chinese Communist Party. Insensitivity to Tibetan culture and history was a given. There was therefore, an inbuilt rift between the Chinese and the Tibetans that widened in the years from 1950 onwards.

In early March 1959, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi spoke to the Charge d’Affaires at the Indian Embassy in Beijing, I.

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